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Abstract
Increasing female landownership or labor force participation are policies designed to empower
women in developing countries. Yet, societies are diverse and I find that across language and
ethnic groups not all Pakistani women benefit from these increased economic opportunities in their
decision making. I even find negative impacts of labor force participation on empowerment for some
groups. This can be explained by different gender expectations along these gendered institutions.
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1. Introduction
Empowering women can lead to better health and economic outcomes within the households.
Empowered women typically invest more in the health of their children, invest in durable goods,
and in the education of their children (Allendorf 2007, Mishra and Sam, 2016, Menon, Van der
Meulen Rodgers, and Kennedy 2017). Furthermore, empowering women at the household level can
lead over time to more gender equality and to economic development at the macroeconomic level
(Duflo 2012). However, this process needs time and according to Duflo a continued effort from
policy makers not just in developing countries. Though, gender inequality is higher in developing
countries, and especially high in countries in South Asia. Here, especially Pakistan is ranked very
low in gender equality.1
Yet, promoting this non-arguably noble goal can create potential problems. These problems
can include the ineffectiveness of policies designed to promote women empowerment (Mabsout and
Staveren 2009) but also increase tensions and create conflict between opposing groups within a
country (Tahir 2017). This can raise the question of aid effectiveness which is typically consid-
ered to be more effective at the micro level (Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009,2010,2013), Denizer,
Kaufmann and Kraay 2013). However, even at the micro level, the success of development policies
depends on regional factors but also on factors like ethnicity, e.g. problems caused by ignoring
cultural heterogeneity within a country and using the same policy recipe across diverse groups
(Bhaumik, Gang, and Yun 2006).
Moreover, measuring women empowerment is not straightforward because empowerment itself
contains many dimensions and a clear cut definition does not exist. Proposed indicators like the
Women Empowerment’s Index WEI (or for agriculture, the WEIA) include different domains.
These domains can be agency, control over income, leadership within the community as well as
control over resources and time in general (Alkire et al. 2013, Bacon et al. 2016). Other, indicators
like the Global Gender Gap Index include even more dimensions.2
Most indices have in common that with empowerment the bargaining position of women within a
household increases. Empowerment can be measured by some (increased) level of autonomy within
1Pakistan is ranked very low in gender equality. The 2016 Human Development Report (UNDP 2016) ranks
Pakistan 130 out of 159 countries in 2015. Even lower, the Global Gender Gap Report 2016 (WEF 2016) ranks
Pakistan on 143 out of 144 countries.
2The Global Gender Gap index also includes variables on health outcomes and more labor market outcomes (WEF
2016).
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the household. Specifically, using household level data sets from developing countries, autonomy
can include what kind of decisions can be made alone or sometimes jointly. Joint decision making
is already an improvement in an environment where the husband (or older relatives) usually makes
decisions alone. These decisions can include fertility preferences, deciding on (large) household
purchases, leaving the house alone are something seemingly trivial as the decision over what kind
of food to cook.
This raises the question of how the role of women is defined in a society, and further, if the
definition is uniform across groups and if probable differences are testable. Empirically they are
difficult to tackle down in demographic surveys designed for a different research question. Thus,
I attempt a more indirect way. I explore the dimension of a gendered identity in the context of
gendered institutions, a concept from gender studies (Acker 1992). Gendered institutions form the
environment women (and men) live in and can be the law favoring men but also ethnicity differing
by gender expectations, and thus, what role women have (Yuval-Davis 1994).
Mabsout and Staveren (2009) introduce this concept to the development economics literature
to test the role of landownership on autonomy outcomes for women in Ethiopia. They assume that
ethnicity can affect empowerment outcomes.
Here, I use Pakistan as an example and extent the discussion started by Mabsout and Staveren.
Pakistan is typically considered a very patriarchal society limiting the role of (married) women to
that of a child bearer (Ali et al. 2017). Household decisions are usually made by the husband or by
older relatives. These expectations on the role of women define the individual (gendered) identity
but are also formed by a group or ethnic identity.
Identity itself can be influenced by the environment someone grows up and lives in. This can
be the ethnic group but also the language somebody uses. Some argue, that language defines most
actions and shape the ethnic identity (Reyes 2010). Either way, I use both measurements of a group
identity to test their impact on empowerment outcomes. Pakistan itself is a multi-ethnic but also
multi-language society. There is an ample of literature showing that in this special case, language
does affect and defines ethnic groups (Ahmed 1996, Rahman 1996, Ahmed 1999). Most of the
internal conflicts in Pakistan are for instance over language instead of typical ethnic dimensions.
For instance, Urdu is the official language but was only spoken by a minority when Pakistan was
founded. Yet, it was made the language of school textbooks, official documents, radio. Ever since
then, Pakistan has seen struggle over language issues (Rahman 1996).
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In using the 2012/13 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PHDS), I utilize landownership
and the working status of women to test impact on empowerment outcomes. These outcome include
decisions women can make at the household level. I find that landownership can empower women
but as expected not across all language or ethnic groups. I also utilize another empowerment
outcome from the domestic violence literature. Typically women who are empowered experience
less domestic violence because they oppose their violent husbands. In using different outcomes of
domestic violence, I find that women who own land, are less likely to be beaten. Yet, women who
are working experience more domestic violence. A finding, which seems surprising at first but can
be explained by husbands envying the likely better labor outcome of their wives (Eswaran and
Malhotra 2011, Heath 2013). Thus, working can increase the vulnerability of women within the
household. Additionally, these women cannot decide on how to spent their earnings. In a country
with very low female employment rates, working can be seen as something negative, not expected
from the ethnic or language group they belong to.
My paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I briefly discuss the language and ethnic groups
and how they possibly differ in their gender expectations. These groups can be seen as gendered
institutions forming identity. This is followed by a discussion of my data set and the empirical
strategy in section 3. In section 4, I discuss the results. A conclusion follows in section 5.
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2. Ethnic and Language Groups in Pakistan
Pakistan is a country with many ethnic and language groups. According to the World Fact
Book (CIA 2018) the major ethnic groups in Pakistan are Punjabis, Paschtuns, Sindhis, Saraikis,
Muhajirs, Balochis, Hindkowans, Chitralis, and Gujarati. There are also smaller groups which
can be mainly found in the North of the country.3 Saraiki, Balochi, Hindko, and other languages
at the state level. Further, English is also the official language for the government and used by
the elite. The majority of Pakistani are mostly Muslims (96,4 percent in 2010). Other religions
include Hindu, Christians and smaller sects. Most of the literature on ethnic and languages groups
discusses the role of potential for conflict between these groups and between minor groups and the
government. Pakistan has been striven by internal conflict since 1947 and the literature focuses on
the historic roots and developments of these conflicts (Ahmed 1996, Rahman 1996, Ahmed 1999).
Thus, the role of women and is merely not discussed, at least in the English literature available
outside of Pakistan.4
Yet, these groups have deep historic roots long before Pakistan was founded, differences not just
in their languages and thus it can be assumed that they have different gender expectations along
with their ethnic (or language) group identity. Matsoub and Staveren (2010) argue that ethnicity
is another example of a gendered institution. This is true, given that different ethnic groups have
different expectations in doing gender. Similarly, one could argue that a language group does the
same. Overall, the difference between these concepts are small and maybe the concept of group
identity (Edwards 2009) or social identity (Kelly-Hall 2012) fits these as well. These form the
individual identity, daily routines, own expectations and expectations of what is expected.
I use ethnicity and language as gendered institution in this paper and interchangeably. These
overlap because ethnic groups have their own language. The question is how much do they overlap,
e.g. can ethnic groups have different languages or can a language belong to different ethnic groups.
The answer is yes, and for Pakistan a diverse culture, this is also true. In Table 1 I show how
ethnic groups and language groups overlap for the data set, I use. Interestingly, although Urdu is
3The distributions is as follows: Punjabi 44.7%, Pashtun 15.4%, Sindhi 14.1%, Sariaki 8.4%, Muhajirs 7.6%,
Balochi 3.6%, and other groups 6.3% (CIA 2018).
4I do not assume that there is much written in Urdu or other Pakistani languages either. Nonetheless, Pakistan
is a very patriarchal society changing slowing to more gender equality and recognizing issues regarding the rights of
women. For instance, after years of discussion, violence against women is since 2012 a punishable crime, at least in
one state (Balochistan).
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a language a majority identifies themselves as Urdu, e.g. as an ethnic group.5
Even if I use ethnic and language groups as similar concepts in my empirical models it should
be noted, that linguists argue that language defines someones identity more than ethnic identity
because language is something someone is born into and has no choice over (Joseph 2004, Reyes
2010, Kelly-Hall 2012).
[Table 1 about here]
From the available literature it is difficult to judge how language or ethnic groups differ in doing
gender, e.g. if some groups are more progressive than others towards women empowerment. Tariq
(1996) and Lall (2011) are an exemption and give at least a starting point for the empirical analysis
following.
Tariq (1996) analyses the internal conflict in Pakistan as a conflict between language groups and
the official government forcing languages (e.g. Urdu) on these groups. He illustrates the motives
and the origin of the language groups and their struggle until they were officially recognized by
the government of Pakistan. However, sometimes, he notes that some groups are more progressive
towards education in general. This could be a puzzle piece and be interpreted as a more progressive
group identity likely not opposing women empowerment. The Pashtu identity is described as
egalitarian and values autonomy. Furthermore, the Balochi and Mohajir value education. However,
the role of gender is not mentioned at all.
In contrast, Lall (2011) focuses directly on the attitude of parents from different ethnic groups
towards schooling of their girls. She analyses their motives in a qualitative research design. Even if
the samples are relatively small, e.g. 89 parents from five different ethnic groups living in different
rural areas , this can be another puzzle piece. These parents are Punjabi, Balochi, Sindhis, Pathans
and Bengalis. She finds that Punjabi, Balochi, Pathans and Bengalis have a strong culture of the
inclusion of girls, while Sindhis show the highest level of gender disparity.
I introduce a final descriptive puzzle piece in the section following. I use the Pakistan DHS to
identify differences between the ethnic and language groups for various outcomes related to women
empowerment.
5This could also be because the level of education is very low on the average in the households interviewed and
the question was misinterpreted.
5
3. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Strategy
Data and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate the effect of landownership and labor force participation on women empowerment,
I utilize the Pakistan 2012/13 Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS). The PDHS is a nationally
representative household survey and contains questions on women’s decision making in the house-
hold but also a module on domestic violence. In total 13,588 ever-married women of age 15 to
49 were interviewed belonging to 3,134 households. The domestic violence module interviewed a
smaller sample of women of 3,687 women.
In countries heavily based on agriculture, landownership is a mean to generate more stable
income, and for women, reduce the dependency of their husbands (Mishra and Sam 2016, Menon,
van der Meulen Rodgers, and Kennedy 2017). 64 percent of the Pakistani population lives in rural
areas and a majority lives from agriculture (Agricultural Census 2010). Landownership of women
is guaranteed by the constitution of Pakistan since 1973. Women for instance can buy, inherit or
obtain land by dowry (Khattak, Brohi, and Anwar 2010). Yet, only a minority of women have
landownership alone (or jointly).
In contrast, the labor force participation of woman is higher than the landownership rates.
Working outside the home is another mean to increase household income, and, thus, economic
safety as well as reducing the monetary dependency of the husband. In Pakistan female labor force
participation has steadily been increasing since the 1970’s (Ejaz 2007) and is currently around 15
percent. Compared to other developing countries this rate is still relatively low. Mostly more
educated and younger women decide to work (Naqvi and Shahnaz 2002, Ejaz 2007)
In Table 2 I present a variety of women’s empowerment outcomes which can be found in the
literature. I sorted them according to categories women should be able to decide on, e.g. fertil-
ity, health and labor market related outcomes. Given, I focus on landownership and labor force
participation as means to increase women’s empowerment, I tabulate averages for these indicators.
Additionally, I add if women are regularly beaten. The picture is quite diverse but overall women
with landownership have more say in the household than women who do not own land. The least
say in household decisions have women who are frequently beaten by their husband. The picture is
more diverse for working women. It depends on the indicator chosen but there is a tendency that
these are slightly empowered compared to women who are not working. However, my focus will be
on the decision making within the household along the dimension language and ethnicity.
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[Table 2 about here]
Along the dimensions language and ethnicity, I chose indicators more relevant to my paper.
These include foremost questions about decision making and therefore related to autonomy. It is
already possible to judge these groups according to their openness to female empowerment at this
purely descriptive point. Typically, along the items chosen a indicator could be constructed. The
WEI and similar indicators are examples. In constructing a simple index, I assign a ’1’ if an item
is above the overall average and a ’0’ if below. I sum these and divide the sum by the number of
items. If a language or ethnic group is above the average over all items it could have the highest
value of ’1’. In contrast, the lowest value would be ’0’ if the group is constantly below the overall
average.
In Table 3 and in Table 4 I present average values for education, beaten and different decision
making outcomes. In the last column a simple index is computed. Most of these variables correlate
with education. Educated women are typically more aware about their rights and also able to make
informed decisions, e.g. over their own well-being or of their children. I have eight language groups
and a group other where other smaller groups are summarized. As expected, I have more ethnic
groups available, 19 and one group for other. Urdu und Punjabi groups are open the most towards
women empowerment along the language and ethnic group definition. Once focusing on ethnicity
only, Kashmiri, Hindko, and Brushaski are also open towards women empowerment. Pushto and
Balochi are least open towards women empowerment. Urdu, Punjabi are one of the major ethnic
groups in Pakistan. However, from these purely descriptive findings, I cannot judge how landown-
ership and the working status affect women’s empowerment and how possible effects differ across
gendered institutions. I test the effect in the estimations following.
[Table 3 and Table 4 about here]
Empirical Strategy
I use a standard linear probability model (LPM) to test the impact of landownership and labor
force participation (LFP) on women’s autonomy. The empirical model takes the following form:
Autonomyij = α+ γLandownershipij + δWorkingij + β1Womanijt + β2SESijt + ρj + ij (1)
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I measure women’s empowerment as autonomy outcomes. Autonomy of a women i belonging to
language or ethnic group j include outcomes on decision making. These decisions at the household
level are: if a woman can decide alone on visiting a health facility, on spending her own earnings, on
large household purchases and on family visits. The main variables of interest are landownership
and the working status, i.e. the labor force participation. These are typically considered to have
mostly positive effects on women’s empowerment. If a woman i belonging to group j owns land
alone, the variable landownership takes the value of ’1’ and zero otherwise. Similarly, if a woman
i belonging to group j is working the variable LFP takes the value of ’1’ and zero otherwise.
Information on age, education, number of children und the age difference between her husband
can be found in the variable Woman. The variable SES, socio-economic status, includes the wealth
status and if the households lives in an urban area. The variable ρj includes the region a household
lives in but also indicators for language group and ethnic group in my baseline regressions to account
for possible endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias (OVB). It is likely that autonomy and
landownership or working status are influenced by gender expectations as Mabsout and Staveren
(2009) argue. Omitting the ethnic group can cause OVB, because some groups are more open
towards women empowerment than others. Yet, including indicators on these groups can also be
found in previous work but the interpretation is different here. I include these dummy variables
in my baseline regressions and test their significance. If they are significant, the information on
language and ethnic group should be used further. Thus, I test the impact of landownership and
working status on autonomy by language group and ethnic group in additional regressions. ij is a
standard robust error term. It is possible to cluster the standard errors along the ethnic group or
language group level but this will become obsolete, once I estimate the above equation by language
or ethnicity.
Later, and additionally, I change the autonomy outcome variable to outcomes for domestic
violence. Domestic violence is often more accepted by less empowered women and it can be assumed
that with increased empowerment, women are less likely to accept domestic violence (Finnoff 2012,
Niaz, Hassan, and Tariq 2017) and domestic violence outcomes should be less in the household.
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4. Results
Baseline Models
In Table 5 I show results for models including landownership and the working status of women
as possible means to increase women empowerment. I have four decision making outcomes: health,
earnings, purchases, and family visits. Per decision making outcome I have three models. One
model without language and ethnic group variables, one model with language group variables and
one model with ethnic group variables, additionally to my standard control variables. Before turning
to the discussion of my main variables of interest, I discuss briefly the role of age, education and
similar control variables.
Older women are in the bargaining literature considered to have more bargaining power within
the household, and thus, can be more empowered. They are more experienced in handling their own
position within the household. A similar argument can be made for education. Educated women
are more aware about their rights and their position within the household (Taucher 1991, 1995,
Aizer 2011). I find that older and more educated women can decide more on health facility visits,
purchases and family visits. For deciding on their own earnings the effect is not significant. This
can be because the sample is significantly smaller, e.g. before I had more than 12,000 observations
and for labor earnings ca. 2200 women. Furthermore, these women are younger and already
more educated than the overall sample. However, it should be noted, that education in Pakistan
mostly means women visited only a few years of basic schooling. Women in urban areas are more
empowered than women in rural areas. The age difference, e.g. if the husband is older, has a small
negative impact on the household decision making of women.
Landownership is typically considered to increase women empowerment (Mabsout and Staveren
2009, Mishra, Khusbu, and Sam Abdoul 2016, Menon, van der Meulen Rodgers, and Kennedy
2017). Here, I find that for the overall sample landownership has no significant effect on any of
the decision making variables. This is unexpected and does not change, once adding language or
ethnicity control variables. A possible explanation could be, that only a few women do own land in
Pakistan. Another explanation could be that this overall effect masks a possible different effect at
the language or ethnic group level. Here, different gender expectations could matter and different
effects of landownership on decision making are more than likely. Thus, I come back to this possible
channel after discussing the impact of the working status of women for the overall sample.
The working status of women has a significant effect on decision making. However, the impact
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of working status is not positive across all dimensions of decision making. While, women who are
working can decide more on health visits, large purchases and family visits, they cannot decide on
their own earnings. In a patriarchal society like Pakistan, husbands can have the decision power
over the household total income. Even if the overall position of women seem to improve by deciding
on other questions, not deciding on their own earnings is a drawback, when it comes to women
empowerment. Deciding on their own earnings seems relatively more important than deciding on
for instance family visits. In a bargaining game, this could be seen as something the husband gives
in the sense of a ”stick and carrot” action or a concession to the wife, but takes away in deciding
on earnings. Nonetheless, she could decide not to work as threat.6
At the bottom of Table 5 I show the p-values for a joint-significance F-Test for including lan-
guage or ethnic group variables into the estimation. Matsoub and Staveren (2009) argue while
not including ethnic groups in their Ethiopian sample, an omitted variable bias (OVB) could be
created. This is a source of endogeneity because language or ethnic groups have different gender
expectations. Thus, they can be seen as gendered institutions or groups having a gendered iden-
tity. If some groups are generally more open towards women empowerment for instance, women
can work or decide more to begin with. Excluding these control variable would bias coefficient of
working status (or landownership). Here, I find, even if there are significant, the results do not
change. At least this source of endogeneity is likely not present in my sample. However, I take
the joint significance of language or ethnic group variables as a suggestions that it matters to what
group someone belongs to and show in Table 6 and in Table 7 the effect of landownership and
working status by these gendered institutions.
[Table 5 about here]
Estimations by gendered institutions
I show the effect of landownership and working status on women’s empowerment by language
group and ethnic group in two separate tables. For clarity reasons, I only present the coefficients of
these two variables. The control variables not shown are the same as above. I begin the discussion
by language group in Table 6. For the overall sample I found no significant effect of landownership
on any decision making outcome. Once focussing on language groups, I do find an significant effect
6However, a likely non-credible threat, if women have to work because the household is poor.
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for some groups. However, the effect of landownership for these groups is negative. Women who
own land can decide less than women who do not own land. Thus, owning land does not improve
their bargaining position within the household but actually decreases it. This can be explained by
envy of the husband not owning land. Remember, this is landownership solely by the wife and not
jointly by wife and husband.
The findings for working status are more diverse than before. While for the whole sample I
found a negative impact for earnings and a positive effects for other dimensions of decision making,
here I find these effects only for a few language groups. Some groups are more open, e.g. Urdu
or Punjabi, towards women empowerment than other language groups. Yet, none of the language
groups allows women to decide on their own earnings. The financial responsibility lies with the
husband and this seems to be deeply rooted in the Pakistani culture. Less monetary decisions
(e.g. over the use of time) is more a female matter and typically considered to be made by women
anyways, e.g. health facility or family visits.
[Table 6 about here]
In Table 7 I use the same models as above and show the effect of my two empowerment vari-
ables on decision making by ethnic groups. Ethnic groups like language groups can have different
gendered expectations but I cannot show if these expectations differ between ethnic and language
groups. It is likely, that language defines ethnic identity more than vice versa, and thus, the ex-
pectations in that definition of a gendered institution should be similar. For instance, many Urdu
speaking Pakistani identify themselves as Urdu. Yet, Urdu is not considered to be an ethnicity in
Pakistan. Further, in comparison to the sample size for language groups, the use of ethnic groups
results in very small samples for some groups. These include foremost e.g. the English, the Whakhi,
Marwari and Farsi ethnicity. With this limitation, using language as an identifier is from a sample
size point of view maybe the preferable option. However, for the major ethnic groups I can judge
the empowerment effect of landownership and working status.
Compared to the use of language groups as a gendered institution, I find a significant effect of
landownership on women’s decision making. Though, the effect of landownership various between
the ethnic groups drastically. Before, I found an insignificant effect. Now, I can identify groups
where landownership has a positive effect on women’s empowerment, no significant effect but also
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a negative effect. However, the tendency is no effect or mostly a significant negative effect. For
the language groups I identified as more open before, e.g. Urdu and Punjabi, landownership has
no effect across any decision making outcome. Though, for groups likely less open to women’s
empowerment, e.g. Pahori and Balochi, there is tendency that this previous finding can be found
here again. The negative effect of landownership could again be explained by envy through the
husband. It is probable that he accepts that the wife owns land but otherwise does not give her
any more freedom in decision making. Why is the wife not leaving the husband could be asked.
Surely, she has some economic safety with owning land and could leave the husband. First, she
could just accept her role as a Pakistani woman as a child bearer and leaves most decision to the
husband. Second, leaving the husband is in Pakistan often not an option, because women could
be ousted by relatives or even victim of a honor killing (Aurat Foundation 2014). Furthermore,
domestic violence is very common in Pakistan and not opposing the husband could reduce the risk
to become a victim of domestic violence. Because of this, in the last part of my paper I analyse
the effect of landownership and working on status on domestic violence outcomes. Some authors
use domestic violence as another empowerment outcome, e.g. empowered women accept violence
less (Diallo and Voia 2016, Sohini 2016, Lenze and Klasen 2017).
The results for working status of women on their ability to make decisions at home, are similar
to the findings for language groups. Women in some ethnic groups have more say in health facility
visits, large purchases and family visits. These groups are previously assumed to be more open
towards empowerment, e.g. Urdu, Punjabi, Siraiki and Hindko. Yet, as I found before, this finding
reverse for deciding on the own earnings. Here, working status has no effect or even a negative
significant effect. There is not a single ethnic group where women who have their own earnings can
decide on how to use these directly. From an empowerment view this a throwback, getting women
to work outside the home is in the empowerment literature one of the major means to empower
them. Even, if they have say over the other decision making outcomes, as above, I assume this more
or less a concession from the husband. Nonetheless, he also has a benefit from his wife working and
attributing to the household income additionally to her household work and her role as a mother.
[Table 7 about here]
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Another channel to women’s empowerment - domestic violence
The reasons for domestic violence (DV) can be manifold, and there as such, are economic models
explaining domestic violence (DV) within the household context (Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991,
Tauchen and Witte 1995). DV can be seen as instrument to exert power to induce or change
behavior of the victim (typically women) or sometimes even just an instrument to increases utility
by deriving pleasure from these actions. Still, DV changes the distribution of wealth within a
household towards the male perpetrator. In more modern settings DV is seen within bargaining
models where the ”normal” bargaining fails and violence is used as mean to maintain the own
position within the household.
Risk factors at the individual level can include low self esteem and being exposed to violence
during childhood can be reasons to be violent against someone’s partner (Tauchen, Witte, and Long
1991). Further reasons are the usual suspects, low levels of education, unemployment (usually the
male) alcoholism and drug abuse and other channels inducing stress at the individual level (Averett
and Wang 2016). Risk factors at the household level typically include low income (Tauchen, Witte,
and Long 1991, WHO 2005, Aizer 2011). While at the societal level, traditional gender roles and
expectations play in developing countries a major role in committing domestic violence (WHO 2005,
Finnoff 2012). Gender expectations are the main reason for the high rates of domestic violence,
and violence against women in general, in patriarchal societies like the one in Pakistan (Aurat
Foundation 2014, Ali et al. 2015).
However, empowered women are quite often less accepting of domestic violence (Justino, Leone,
and Salardi 2015, Diallo and Voia 2016, Sohini 2016, Lenze and Klasen 2017). This is why some
authors use DV as an empowerment outcome. Yet, I see DV as an indirect channel of women’s
empowerment because typically variables increasing women’s empowerment do not necessarily have
to affect DV. Nonetheless, working status was used in the past (Diallo and Voia 2016, Sohini 2016,
Lenze and Klasen 2017). Here, I use landownership additionally as an empowerment outcome
reducing domestic violence at the household level. If, landownership can empower women, and
empowered women are likely to be less accepting of DV, landownership could (or should) have a
similar effect on DV as working status has.
My empirical analysis is similar to the above. My empowerment outcomes changes to various
domestic violence outcomes. These include if a woman was beaten, threaten, humiliated or insulted
frequently in the 12 months before the survey was taken. I include risk factors like alcoholism and
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unemployment of the husband as additional control variables. Note, that the sample of women is
reduced to roughly 3400 women because not all women were asked about domestic violence. The
empirical model is of following form and estimated by a linear probability model:
DVij = α+ γEmpowermenti + βWomeni + θHusbandi + δSESi + ij (2)
DVij is a variable indicating the domestic violence experience in the last 12 months of woman i
being a member of the gendered institution (language or ethnic group) j. These outcomes include
being beaten, threatened, humiliated or insulted by the husband. The variable Empowerment
is landownership and working status of woman i. Standard information on the wife and on the
husband (e.g. working status, alcoholism) can be found in the variable Women and Husband.
Household characteristics are included in the variable SES. I follow the same estimation strategy
as before. First I estimate a model for all women including control variables for language group
or ethnicity. Then I estimate the effect by language group and ethnic group to show the effect of
empowerment variables on domestic violence outcomes at the gendered institution level.
In Table 8 I show the results of working status and landownership on DV for the overall sample.
I do not report all coefficients to focus on the empowerment outcomes and alcoholism. Alcoholism
of the husband is the usual suspect why violence takes place within the household. Thus, the effect
of alcoholism on DV is pronounced.
As above landownership itself has no significant effect on DV outcomes. Yet, the signs of the
estimations coefficients are mostly negative and I assume, once focusing on effects at the gendered
group level, some language or ethnic groups are likely to have, a positive effect on landownership
in reducing domestic violence. However, the effect of working on DV outcomes is significant, and,
even negative. Thus, women who work are more likely to experience some form of domestic vi-
olence. The likelihood of experiencing DV ranges from 2 to 3 percent depending on the type of
DV. Compared to alcoholism it is significant less, but given, that getting women to work is usually
something positive, e.g. empowers the woman, here I find a side effect which should be not ignored.
This finding was found by other for some parts of their samples before (Eswaran and Malhotra
2011, Heath 2013). The husband could envy the income of the woman, or if she opposes him
because she feels empowered by work, he will maintain is bargaining position within the household
by violence. This finding is sometimes known as male-backslash (Aizer 2007). This effect can be
more pronounced in Pakistan, because DV is more common to begin with and sometimes even
14
accepted by the women. The PHDS offers some question on acceptance of DV by women and up
to 25 percent of the women in this sample, agree that there are good reasons for DV, e.g. burned
food or going out without permission.
[Table 8 about here]
At the gendered institution level, the picture changes. Landownership reduces domestic violence
for some language groups (Table 9) and ethnic groups (Table 10). This is an encouraging finding
given that landownership had mostly no effect on decision making. I identified some of these groups
as more open to empowerment in my summary tables before. However, less encouraging is, that
working increase domestic violence. The finding is similar to above where I found that working
women have less say in how to spent their earnings. Arguably, the husband could envy that the
wife is working. Even further, it is also likely that some of her duties at home could suffer from
her working outside the home. This could increase tensions between her and the husband. As I
found previously, groups like Urdu or Punjabi seem to more progressive towards women in some
categories but when women work, this increase for instance being beaten, the most severe form of
DV. This could conflict more with traditional gender expectations than allowing her to decide on
seemingly for the male, less important decisions at home.
Possible robustness checks
The above analysis is of explorative nature. My focus is on showing that language or ethnic
groups differ in women empowerment outcomes, and thus, in their gender expectations. With this,
they arguably have a gendered group identity and could be seen as a gendered institution. Yet,
it is always possible to use more empowerment outcomes, like fertility preference, or some more
decision making outcomes, e.g. what food to cook. However, I already choose decision making
outcomes more important for the household. Furthermore, I could use an empowerment index,
similar to the WEI. Though, I lack information on actually income or community involvement. I
used a simple index for a purely descriptive argument, knowing it lacks information for a deeper
analysis. However, a major concern is the usual issue of endogeneity. While, OVB may not exist
once controlling for the language or ethnic group women belong to, the issue of reversed causality
should be kept in mind. The major concern is, what if empowered women are more prone to work or
more prone to own land, and thus estimating the impact of these variables improving empowerment
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could be biased. For now, I cannot deal with this issue because of a lack of possible instruments. I
would need an instrument explaining landownership without affecting the decision making or DV
outcome, and a similar problem arises the labor force participation of women. What happens if
DV at home drives women out of the home into work to avoid hostilities. For instance, Lenze and
Klasen (2017) find after instrumenting for the working status of women that a previous positive
effect on DV vanishes. They use the average labor force participation of women in the same cluster.
For the sake of my argument, that there is gendered group identity, this IV would already be an
empowerment outcome itself.
Nonetheless, I make the argument that there could be reasons why endogeneity itself may be of
minor nature. For instance, only a minority of two percent of the women in the sample own land.
Although, I do not know how they got the land, in Pakistan it is more common to own land as
dowry or as an inheritance. If this is true for most women, empowerment itself has little effect on
landownership. Furthermore, Pakistan is one of the poorest countries of the world. Women need
to work to supplement the household total income. The labor force participation in my sample is
significantly higher among women at the lower end of the wealth distribution. Then, the reason
for work is a purely economic one, and not DV at home. This becomes even a less of an issue
considering that 25 to 30 percent of the women accept some form of DV if they do something
wrong at home.
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5. Conclusion
Empowering women and promoting gender equality are two of the new millennium develop-
ment goals of the UN. Pakistan scores very low in many gender equality indicators. Given, that
empowering women has positive effects on health and educational outcomes at the household level
and over time at the macroeconomic level, understanding factors driving empowerment in coun-
tries like Pakistan is crucial. Yet, in many studies the dimension of gendered group identity has
been overlook. Ethnic groups (or language groups) have their own (gendered) identity. Within
a group gender expectations are formed, an thus a gendered institution is present. These gender
expectations influence the daily lives of women. Furthermore, gender expectations at the ethnic (or
language) group level can influence the effectiveness of policies promoting women empowerment if
group heterogeneity is ignored. Even further, in a male dominated society like Pakistan promoting
women empowerment is difficult to begin with and thus accounting of these differences in gender
expectations can prove fruitful.
Here I use the labor force participation and landownership of women to estimate their effect on
empowerment outcomes, foremost decision making at the household level but also domestic violence
outcomes. In using the 2012 / 13 Pakistan Demographic Health Survey, I find that their effect is
not uniform across ethnic or language groups. For less important decisions women can make at
home I find a positive effect. However, for deciding on their own earnings, I find that working
women are not able to fully decide how to spent these earnings. Furthermore, these women also
suffer more under violence at home. Yet, there is some hope. Landownership decreases domestic
violence at home for some groups, while not having a significant effect on decision making.
I cannot explain in detail where the difference between ethnic or language groups originate from.
Yes, they are historically grown but exploring these roots is a task I leave to anthropologists or
sociologists. Further, the issue of endogeneity may be still present, even if I gave some reasons why
the concern of endogeneity can be lessened. I assume that strong gender expectations are present in
Pakistan which have deep historic roots. Thus, they can be seen as mostly exogenous in the short
run. Further, I use established empowerment indicators typically not showing what empowerment
means to the women. Future work (and surveys) could explore this dimensions further. O’Hara
and Clement (2018) use an empowerment consciousness index which is an interesting and promising
step into a deeper understanding of the empowerment mechanisms at the individual but also group
level.
17
However, promoting women labor force participation and landownership in Pakistan should not
be stopped. Even if it is a long process, changing the perception towards domestic violence should
likely to be addressed first. Domestic violence is widely accepted in Pakistan and laws are mostly
protecting the male perpetrators. Organizations like Violence against Women have some success
in changing this, for instance at the state level.
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6. Tables
Table 1: Language spoken by ethnicity
Ethnicity / Language Urdu Punjabi Sindhi Pushto Baluchi Baruhi Sariaki Others Total
Urdu 1,229 32 14 2 1 2 3 3 1,286
% 95.57 2.49 1.09 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.23 100.00
Punjabi 549 2,485 3 8 2 1 6 8 3,062
% 17.93 81.16 0.10 0.26 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.26 100.00
Sindhi 21 0 1,223 6 6 4 17 2 1,279
% 1.64 0.00 95.62 0.47 0.47 0.31 1.33 0.16 100.00
Pushto 68 9 4 2,827 3 4 4 27 2,946
% 2.31 0.31 0.14 95.96 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.92 100.00
Balochi 6 0 24 17 530 13 7 0 597
% 1.01 0.00 4.02 2.85 88.78 2.18 1.17 0.00 100.00
English 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
% 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 0.00 0.00 100.00
Barauhi 2 0 11 7 9 538 1 1 569
% 0.35 0.00 1.93 1.23 1.58 94.55 0.18 0.18 100.00
Siraiki 29 10 70 5 2 7 1,213 4 1,340
% 2.16 0.75 5.22 0.37 0.15 0.52 90.52 0.30 100.00
Hindko 84 18 7 9 0 0 6 426 550
% 15.27 3.27 1.27 1.64 0.00 0.00 1.09 77.45 100.00
Kashmiri 8 5 0 1 0 0 0 18 32
% 25.00 15.63 0.00 3.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 56.25 100.00
Shina 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 647 650
% 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.54 100.00
Brushaski 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 116
% 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.14 100.00
Wakhi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
% 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 100.00
Chitrali/Khwar 52 0 0 14 0 0 0 50 116
% 44.83 0.00 0.00 12.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 43.10 100.00
Balti 12 0 0 0 0 1 0 372 385
% 3.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 96.62 100.00
Pahari 11 5 2 0 0 3 0 19 40
% 27.50 12.50 5.00 0.00 0.00 7.50 0.00 47.50 100.00
Potowari 23 54 0 0 0 2 0 28 107
% 21.50 50.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.87 0.00 26.17 100.00
Marwari 7 0 20 0 0 0 1 43 71
% 9.86 0.00 28.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.41 60.56 100.00
Farsi 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 8 15
% 20.00 0.00 0.00 13.33 13.33 0.00 0.00 53.33 100.00
Others 93 4 15 3 0 0 1 271 387
% 24.03 1.03 3.88 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.26 70.03 100.00
Total 2,203 2,622 1,393 2,905 556 577 1,259 2,043 13,558
% 16.25 19.34 10.27 21.43 4.10 4.26 9.29 15.07 100.00
Ethnic groups by self-identification. Language spoken can be found the head of each column. Based on the Pakistan DHS
(PHDS) sample from 2012/13.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Women Empowerment
Overall Beaten Landownership Working
Media Exposure
Read Newspaper 25.50 17.63 54.23 22.31
Listen Radio 17.56 18.28 24.05 18.47
Some Literacy 43.76 30.97 68.06 34.61
Family Planning
Contraception 34.30 37.42 44.11 34.57
Not Having Sex 11.24 10.00 17.31 8.61
Wanted Last Child 81.60 75.43 82.46 78.46
Heard of Family Planning (TV) 25.78 24.09 36.88 27.39
Visited Health Facility (12mo) 71.46 68.60 77.57 77.19
Husband opposes contraception 9.72 14.29 5.77 10.36
Want more children 41.51 32.67 38.52 37.69
Desire for more children(2yrs) 20.44 13.56 21.31 22.45
If Husbands has same desire 54.48 44.99 63.35 54.16
Ideal number of children 4.28 4.85 3.63 4.39
Decision maker for birth contr 8.11 13.22 4.31 9.26
Health
Women’s BMI 2448 2444 2629 2343
Smoke 1.39 3.44 0.38 2.53
Permission to go to doctor 21.61 40.00 7.22 20.58
Distance to doctor problem 39.97 55.91 19.77 39.71
Do not want to go alone 53.36 66.88 36.88 48.46
Decides on healthcare 10.48 11.11 15.16 13.79
Other
Residing with husband 88.57 90.67 88.11 90.90
Age at having sex first 18.85 18.23 20.77 18.66
Having sex recently 73.40 76.89 70.90 73.74
Women’s employment
Currently working 19.82 28.45 27.00
Can decide on spending income 50.53 44.55 56.92 49.39
Decides on large purchases 7.02 6.67 9.43 9.30
Decides on family visits 8.89 7.78 9.84 10.59
Owns house 2.26 2.15 24.33 3.09
Owns land 1.94 1.08 100 2.64
Earns more than husband 9.31 10.00 10.77 9.89
Domestic Violence
Beating justified if going out 33.27 42.80 21.29 31.00
Beating justified if argues 37.34 46.45 23.95 35.73
Autonomy
Say in choosing husband 81.65 78.49 83.27 77.63
Say in selling house alone 64.38 40.00 78.13 66.27
Own calculations based on the Pakistan DHS 2012/13 survey.
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